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Abstract We focus on the dynamic relation between wage increases, pro-
motions and job changes. In the empirical analyses, we use the Portuguese-
matched employer–employee data Quadros de Pessoal. We find substantial
wage returns to both promotions and job-to-job transitions. Our results are
not consistent with models of full information and symmetric learning in a
competitive and frictionless market. This might suggest that there is asymmet-
ric information. An alternative explanation is that workers might search for a
good match. Finally, we show that employer-reported promotions differ to a
large extent from changes in hierarchical levels.
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1 Introduction
Career development inside the firm is an important source of wage increases.
Topel and Ward (1992) show that for young workers, only one third of the
wage increases can be attributed to job changes. Within a firm workers can
climb a usually well-defined hierarchy. Promotions to higher levels occur
when workers accumulate human capital or when firms learn about workers’
productivity. These promotions are often associated with substantial wage
increases.
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the relation between
wage increases, promotions and job-to-job transitions. There exists both an
extensive theoretical literature on wage development and promotions (e.g.
Gibbons and Waldman 1999), and on job transitions (e.g. Jovanovic 1979;
Burdett and Mortensen 1998). But the link on what goes on inside and outside
the firm is limited, both theoretically and empirically. Exceptions are recent
studies by Ghosh (2007), Kahn (2007), Schönberg (2007) and Pinkston (2009).
We use a dynamic framework to investigate up to what extent promotions
and job changes can be predicted by the past career path, and how promotions
and job changes affect wage increases. To estimate dynamic models, we need
data covering a sufficiently long period. The Portuguese-matched employer–
employee data Quadros de Pessoal describe a relatively long observation pe-
riod, and include precise and detailed information on both firms and workers.
It is based on an annual enquiry of all firms with wage earners in the private
sector. Since firms report wages, hierarchical levels, detailed job descriptions,
promotion dates, firm size etc., measurement errors are most likely smaller
than in worker survey data. Furthermore, we can continue following workers
also when switching employers. Since job turnover is non-random, this is an
advantage over the empirical literature on internal labor markets using only
data from a single firm.
It should be noted that the Portuguese labor market is characterized by a
centralized wage system setting rules for wage increases and career progres-
sion. However, empirical studies have concluded that there is a substantial
degree of wage flexibility. For example, Cardoso and Portugal (2005) suggest
that agreements reached by collective bargaining are adjusted by firms’ subse-
quent arrangements. Our findings are, therefore, not only the consequence of
existing institutions, but also reflect labor-market dynamics.
We construct two measures for promotions. The data include the worker’s
hierarchical level, which is ranked by a well-defined hierarchy. Our first mea-
sure for promotions is based on changes in hierarchical level. Also Lluis (2005)
uses changes in hierarchical levels as measure for promotions. This definition
connects to the theoretical literature where a promotion is considered to
be a change in hierarchical level accompanied by a change in the worker’s
production technology (e.g. Bernhardt 1995; Gibbons and Waldman 1999).
An advantage of using changes in hierarchical level as promotion is that
it also identifies promotions coinciding with a job-to-job transition. Indeed,
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Scoones and Bernhardt (1998) provide a theoretical model in which job-to-job
transitions are associated with promotions.
The second measure for promotions uses whether the firm reports that the
worker has been promoted in the past year. We show that both promotion
concepts differ substantially. Less than 30% of the changes in hierarchical level
are also considered promotions by the employer. Furthermore, about 40% of
the employer-reported promotions are not associated with a change in detailed
job description. The wage returns to an employer-reported promotion are
substantially higher than returns to a change in hierarchical level. Also in other
aspects the estimation results differ substantially between the two promotion
concepts. Our interpretation of these findings is that the eight hierarchical
levels distinguished in the data are too broad to capture all changes in job
complexity and responsibilities, while firms might also report substantial wage
increases as promotions rather than changes in job tasks.
Our empirical results show that after controlling for observed and unob-
served heterogeneity there remains serial correlation in changes in hierarchical
levels. Within the theoretical framework of Gibbons and Waldman (1999),
this is considered evidence in favor of symmetric learning. However, wage
increases do not forecast promotions and serial correlation in wage increases
is absent. The data also do not show the type of serial correlation in wage
increases as predicted by Chiappori et al. (1999) under symmetric learning.
There are substantial returns to switching employers, but the pattern of job-
to-job transitions is not fully consistent with basic job-search theory (e.g.
Burdett and Mortensen 1998). Asymmetric employer learning might be a
possible explanation for the substantial returns to both promotions and job
turnover. This evidence is only circumstantial, we do not provide direct tests
for asymmetric employer learning, and there is no single model which is
consistent with all our findings. Another possible explanation might be that
workers are searching for a good match, as modeled by Jovanovic (1979).
Finally, it should be noted that the estimation results are quite similar for men
and women and for different educational groups, but differ between blue and
white-collar sectors.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss recent theoretical
literature concerning promotions, wage increases and job transitions. This
theoretical literature is used to guide the specification of our empirical models,
which are presented in Section 3. Section 4 provides a detailed description
of the data. In Section 5 we present our empirical results. Section 6 provides
sensitivity analyses. Section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical considerations
The economic literature on promotions is driven by a number of stylized
facts (e.g. Baker et al. 1994a, b). Promotions are associated with large wage
increases. Promotions are, therefore, not only used to assign workers to jobs,
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but can also act as incentives structures to workers (like what is suggested in
rank-order tournaments discussed in Lazear and Rosen 1981). However, wage
increases at promotions are small relative to differences between averages
wages across hierarchical levels. Both wage increases and promotions are
found to be serially correlated. Large wage increases during a stay at one
hierarchical level often predict promotions to the next hierarchical level. The
final stylized fact is that real wage decreases are not rare, but demotions are.
The model of Gibbons and Waldman (1999) can explain many of stylized
facts.1 They consider two types of workers with different ability. Productivity
depends on ability, work experience and shocks.2 Gibbons and Waldman
(1999) distinguish two cases: symmetric learning where both the worker and
firms learn about the worker’s ability; and full information where the ability
is always known to both the worker and firms. Under full information, past
realizations of the worker’s productivity are not informative on the worker’s
ability. Conditional on the worker’s ability wages and promotions are only
driven by accumulated work experience. Under symmetric learning even
after conditioning on the worker’s ability, past realizations of the worker’s
productivity remain important. Conditioning on the true worker’s ability and
work experience is, therefore, not sufficient to remove serial correlation in
wage increases. Workers who experience large wage increases are also more
likely to be promoted as firms believe these are high-ability workers. These
workers also spend less time in a hierarchical level before being promoted
to the next level. This causes wage increases to predict promotions, and that
promotions are serially correlated.
Chiappori et al. (1999) add downward wage rigidity to the model with
symmetric learning. Downward wage rigidity causes that past performance
of a worker with a high recent wage increase which is at least as good
as the past performance of a worker with the same wage but with a low
recent wage increase. Conditional on the current wage, there is thus positive
serial correlation in wage increases. Chiappori et al. (1999) and Gibbons and
Waldman (1999) consider frictionless competitive labor markets where firms
are homogenous in their productivity. In such models, wages equal expected
productivity and workers do not switch employers. However, job turnover is
substantial particularly for young workers and contributes to wage progression
(Topel and Ward 1992).
Schönberg (2007) models job turnover jointly with wage progression and
promotions inside the firm. Like Ghosh (2007), she assumes that workers
receive private disutility shocks about the current match. This is in line with
Jovanovic (1979) who assumes that while working both the worker and the firm
learn about the quality of the match. Both Jovanovic (1979) and Ghosh (2007)
predict declining job separation in job tenure. A similar approach is taken
1Examples of other recent models are Bernhardt (1995), Costrell and Loury (2004), Demougin
and Siow (1994), Kwon (2006) and Owan (2004).
2See Gibbons and Waldman (2006) for an extension of their earlier model.
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by Kahn (2007), who considers a two-period model with disutility shocks of
moving. In the presence of asymmetric learning disutility, shocks generate
adverse selection in job turnover. This was already stressed by Greenwald
(1986) who argued that the better workers stay with their employers. Gibbons
and Katz (1991) first empirically established asymmetric information by com-
paring laid-off workers and plant closures. Waldman (1984) argued that if
outside firms do not observe wages, then promotions are signals. The impli-
cation is that wage increases upon promotion should be substantial to keep the
worker, but, therefore, also fewer promotions occur. DeVaro and Waldman
(2006) assume that education is a signal about ability, and test empirically if
low-educated workers are promoted at a lower rate and receive higher wage
increases upon promotions than high-educated workers. They find evidence
for asymmetric learning. Schönberg (2007) finds that learning is largely sym-
metric. She argues that in the presence of asymmetric learning, early ability
signals such as education have relatively long impacts on wages (this idea
is also exploited by Altonji and Pierret 2001). Kahn (2007) who focuses on
wage variation, finds strong evidence in favor of asymmetric learning. Finally,
Pinkston (2009) assumes that also poaching firms receive a private signal
about worker’s ability and engage in a bidding war with the current firm. The
empirical results show that wage returns to hard-to-observe ability indicators
increase with the employment spell length, which Pinkston (2009) interprets as
evidence in favor of asymmetric employer learning.
There are alternative explanations for job turnover. Most prominent are
job-search models, but these often do not model internal labor markets (e.g.
Burdett and Mortensen 1998). An exception is Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002),
who incorporate wage bargaining in a search model with worker and firm het-
erogeneity. Workers who get an outside offer move only to more productive
firms. In case the poaching firm is much more productive than the current
employer workers might even accept wage cuts, because wage prospects are
better at more productive firms. Wage increases are decreasing in job tenure as
more tenured workers are less likely to receive good outside offers. Job-search
models do not allow for uncertainty about ability. McCall (1990) and Neal
(1999) argue that individuals are not only searching for better jobs, but first
search for a good occupation. Neal (1999) predicts that occupational changes
should not follow simple job changes. And both McCall (1990) and Neal (1999)
show that occupational changes are less common among experienced workers.
3 Empirical models
Gibbons and Waldman (1999) show that under full information in a frictionless
competitive labor market (where wages equal expect productivity), wage
increases wit − wit−1 only depend on the worker’s ability θ1i, the level of labor-
market experience and the worker’s hierarchical level. After controlling for
hierarchical level, ability and experience, promotions should not have any
effect on the wage level wit. However, our model describes wage increases,
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and a promotion implies a switch of production technology. Therefore, even
under full information the occurrence of a promotion pit can affect wage
growth. Symmetric learning yields serial correlation in wage increases, im-
plying that after controlling for the factors mentioned above and the wage
level wit−2, the wage increases wit − wit−1 and wit−1 − wit−2 are correlated. The
reason for conditioning on the wage level wit−2 is to control for all information
already revealed to the market about the worker’s ability. Additionally, we al-
low wage increases to depend on job separations sit from the current employer
and job tenure tit. Our empirical wage equation, therefore, follows
wit − wit−1 = β11(wit−1 − wit−2) + β12wit−2 + β13 pit + β14sit
+β15tit + β16xit−1 + θ1i + ε1it (1)
In the equation, a regressor xit−1 is included. This represents all exogenous
variables, such as age and age squared (to proxy labor-market experience),
firm size, and dummy variables for hierarchical levels, years and industries.
These variables should also control for heterogeneity in the firm’s technolog-
ical function. In Section 5, we present estimation results with different sets of
exogenous variables included in the model.
Our data are collected annually. Figure 1 shows at which moment the
variables are observed. At the start of year t we know the worker’s monthly
wage level wit−1, tenure tit and the exogenous regressors xit−1 (from the survey
in year t − 1). We observe whether or not during year t a worker gets promoted
pit or switches employer sit. Finally, at the end of year t we observe again the
monthly wage wit, tenure tit+1 and the set of regressors xit.
Within the framework of Gibbons and Waldman (1999) a positive value for
β11 implies symmetric learning rather than full information. The specification
has features of Chiappori et al. (1999), who argue that in the presence of
downward wage rigidities symmetric learning means that conditional on the
wage wit−1 the wage increases wit − wit−1 and wit−1 − wit−2 are positively cor-
related. Because they condition on wit−1 instead of wit−2, symmetric learning
implies β11 > β12. Waldman (1984) argues that in case of asymmetric learning
promotions can be signals, and, therefore, wage increases upon promotions
should be large. This implies that β13 should be large and positive.
In a frictionless competitive labor market both under full information
and symmetric learning, wages equal expected productivity. In this case, job
separations do not affect wage increases, so β14 = 0. However, this is only the
case if there is no match specific component in the worker’s productivity as in
Jovanovic (1979). Otherwise, a non-zero value of β14 implies either that learn-
ing is asymmetric or that the labor market is not competitive and frictionless.
Fig. 1 Annual observations in data
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Within the asymmetric employer learning model of Pinkston (2009) workers
move when a poaching firm with a different private signal than the current
employer wins a bidding war. This implies that job-to-job mobility is always
associated to wage increases, i.e. β14 > 0. Also Scoones and Bernhardt (1998)
suggests that job separations are associated to wage increases. However, in
their model a substantial share of the wage increase is due to workers changing
hierarchical level at job separation (i.e. promotion from laborer to manager).
In most job-search models workers only change employers if the outside wage
offer exceeds their current wage. In such a stylized model, the existence of
labor-market frictions β14 should exceed 0. Indeed, Postel-Vinay and Robin
(2002) show that if firms are heterogeneous workers might be willing to accept
a wage cut when they move to a much more productive firm. However, also
their results show that the majority of the job-to-job transitions yield positive
wage increases. Also Jovanovic (1984) allows for the possibility that workers
accept a wage cut at a job transition when moving to an employer with a higher
option value.
The model has the specification of a dynamic panel-data model. We follow
the approach of Arellano and Bond (1991) to estimate the model. To eliminate
worker-specific-fixed effects θ1i, we take first differences,
(wit − wit−1) − (wit−1 − wit−2) = β11((wit−1 − wit−2) − (wit−2 − wit−3))+
β12(wit−2 − wit−3) + β13(pit − pit−1) + β14(sit − sit−1)+
β15(tit − tit−1) + β16(xit−1 − xit−2) + ε1it − ε1it−1
(2)
The equation includes the endogenous regressors (wit−1 − wit−2) − (wit−2 −
wit−3), pit − pit−1, sit − sit−1 and tit − tit−1. Usually, one would take wit−2 −
wit−3, pit−1, sit−1 and tit−1 as instruments. However, wit−2 − wit−3 is already
a regressor. Instead we use wit−3. The validity of our instrumental variables
hinges on the lack of autocorrelation in the error terms εit. We will investigate
this further in Section 6 when we add additional lags as instrumental variables
and perform Sargan tests. In the baseline specification, we have, however, as
many instrumental variables as endogenous regressors. In this just-identified
model, estimation simplifies to using 2SLS as proposed in Anderson and Hsiao
(1982). The estimation method requires that we observe a worker’s wage
in four consecutive years (wit, . . . , wit−3). Furthermore, instruments should
have a sufficiently large predictive power for the endogenous regressors. In
Section 4 after having discussed our data, we investigate the predictive power
of our instruments.
For promotions and job separations, we use similar model specifications as
for wage increases. Our empirical model for promotions is
pit = β21(wit−1 − wit−2) + β22wit−2 + β23 pit−1 + β24sit−1
+β15tit + β26xit−1 + θ2i + ε2it (3)
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Gibbons and Waldman (1999) predict that under full information promotions
depend only on the worker’s ability, the level of labor-market experience and
the current hierarchical level. If there is symmetric learning, there remains
serial correlation in promotions, and promotions can be predicted by wage
increases, which implies β21 > 0 and β23 > 0. Chiappori et al. (1999) argue
again that due to downward wage rigidities, symmetric learning implies that
conditional on wit−1 those workers with higher recent wage increases (wit−1 −
wit−2) are more likely to be promoted, implying β21 > β22. In a frictionless
competitive labor market, the rate at which promotions occur should not
depend whether the worker changed employer, which implies β24 = 0.
Our model for job turnover is
sit = β31(wit−1 − wit−2) + β32wit−2 + β33 pit−1 + β34sit−1
+β35tit + β36xit−1 + θ3i + ε3it (4)
Ghosh (2007) and Schönberg (2007) argue that workers receive private signals
about the disutility of the current match. Workers with long tenure are selected
towards having a low disutility of their match, i.e. β35 < 0. This also generates
state dependence, and, therefore, implies β34 > 0. A similar prediction is made
by Jovanovic (1979). In his model, mainly those with a bad job match switch
employer. In a competitive market this implies a negative correlation between
wit−1 and sit, so β31 < 0 and β31 = β32. Job-search theory provides the same
prediction (e.g. Burdett and Mortensen 1998). If job turnover is mainly due
to labor-market frictions, then after controlling for ability θ3i we expect job
turnover to be higher for workers with lower wages.
The models for promotions and separations are linear probability models.
The main reason for using linear probability models as compared with, for
example, logit or probit is that we want to include worker-fixed effects to
account for heterogeneity in unobserved innate ability. Since wage changes
(wit−1 − wit−2) and the wage level wit−2 are continuous variables, fixed-effects
logit including lagged promotion or separation is problematic. We estimate the
models for promotions and job separations similar to that for wage increases,
so with similar first-stage regressions.
4 Data
In the empirical analyses, we use the Portuguese-matched employer–employee
data set Quadros de Pessoal. These data are annually collected by the Ministry
of Employment, based on a survey that every firm with wage earners has
to complete. The data do not cover public administration, domestic services
and self-employed workers. The compulsory nature of the survey guarantees
that each year information on more than two million workers is recorded.
Quadros de Pessoal provides information on individual characteristics such
as gender, age, schooling, occupation, tenure, earnings, and hours of work.
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Firm characteristics include location, employment, sales, ownership, and legal
setting. Both firms and workers have identification codes that permit to track
them over time. For employers, it is mandatory to post the firm’s response to
survey questions concerning information on employees in a public place inside
the firm. This should reduce measurement errors in the data.
In our empirical analyses, we use data from 1991 to 2000. The data are
collected once per year. Until 1993, data were collected in March, and after
1993 in October. In the empirical analyses, we deal with this discrepancy
by including year dummies. Furthermore, we perform sensitivity analyses
where we only consider the period after 1993. We restrict the sample to
full-time workers between 16 and 65 years old. In total, the data contain
4,202,736 workers, who are observed in 16,245,140 worker-years. We use a
10% random sample including 420,274 workers observed in 1,626,415 worker-
years. We have done some consistency checks. In particular, we checked
the variables gender, birthday, tenure and wage (see the Appendix). After
excluding inconsistencies, which could not be repaired, the data set contains
363,383 individuals and 1,323,298 worker-year observations.
The data contain five components of monthly earnings, a base-wage,
tenure-indexed components, other regularly paid components, non-systematic
payments and extra-time work payments. As the relevant wages, we take
the sum of base-wage, tenure-indexed components and other regularly paid
components. We do not include the other two components as these are specific
to the month in which the data were collected. It should, however, be noted
that the average non-systematic payments are about 7.5% of the average wage,
and extra-time work payments 2%.3 The amounts presented are before taxes
and social-security contributions, and refer to October of each year (or March
for the period 1991–1993). We have deflated wages using the Consumer Price
Index to constant (2000) PTE.
The Quadros de Pessoal contains three types of variables that reveal infor-
mation about workers’ mobility inside firms. Most detailed is the professional
category, which contains over 60,000 possible job descriptions. Since there
is no natural ranking in these job descriptions, using changes in professional
category as measure for promotions is not attractive. The second source of
information about workers’ mobility is hierarchical level, which is based on
skills and tasks. The data distinguish eight hierarchical levels (full description
in the Appendix) defined by law (Decreto-Lei n.o 121/78, 2 June):4
(Level 1) apprentices, interns, trainees;
(Level 2) non-skilled professionals;
(Level 3) semi-skilled professionals;
3Adding these wage components does not affect the estimation results presented in the next
section.
4The law does not explicitly offer an explanation how the hierarchical levels were designed.
However, it seems that the main purpose lies in using them in collective bargaining processes.
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(Level 4) skilled professionals;
(Level 5) higher-skilled professionals;
(Level 6) supervisors, team leaders, foremen;
(Level 7) intermediary executives;
(Level 8) top executives.
A promotion is defined as a movement from a lower to a higher hierarchical
level. To reduce misclassification in hierarchical levels, we have used the
information on professional categories. Since the professional category is much
more detailed than hierarchical level, we consider changes in hierarchical level
that did not imply a change in professional category as misclassifications. The
final measure for worker’s mobility is the reported date of the most recent
promotion. If the date of last promotion is posterior to October of last year
(or March for the period 1991–1993), we consider that the worker has been
promoted. It should be stressed that the firm reports this promotion date,
which most likely reduces the level of subjectiveness in what is considered to
be a promotion.
Since we follow firms and workers over years, we are able to identify
workers movements between firms. We define a separation as a worker
movement from one firm to another in two subsequent years. We use data
on tenure to control for misclassifications in separations.
In Table 1, we present some descriptive statistics of the data. Recall that
for estimating the model, we require observing the worker’s wage in four
consecutive years (wit, . . . , wit−3). So in the estimation we use 106,305 workers
observed in 659,497 worker-years. We provide descriptive statistics for both
samples. Workers who we observe at least in four consecutive waves, are
slightly older, have somewhat more tenure and work in larger firms. Since they
are somewhat more experienced, they also have a slightly higher wage, but
lower annual wage increases. Their promotion rate is slightly higher, and they
less often switch employers. Below we mainly focus attention on all workers.
The mean monthly wage is 125,762 PTE, which is about 627 euros. Workers
experience, on average, an annual wage increase of 5,329 PTE, which is
3.8% of the mean wage. Annually, approximately 7% of the workers change
hierarchical level in two subsequent years. However, firms indicate that each
year, on average, 11.2% of the workers get promoted. The majority of the
workers that got promoted according to the firm, did not change hierarchical
level. Only 2% of all workers are promoted according to the firm and change
hierarchical level in the same year. This suggests that both promotion concepts
measure different movements within the firm. Furthermore, yearly about 4.4%
of the individuals switch firms, and 1.1% of all workers move to a higher
hierarchical level at the same time they switch firms.
The average age of workers is 36, and about 41% are female. On average,
a worker has eight years of tenure within the current firm. The mean firm size
is 30 workers. Almost half of the workers are qualified professionals, which is
the fourth hierarchical level out of eight possible levels. Only about 3% of the
workers are top executives, which in the highest hierarchical level. Compared
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Description Full sample Restricted sample
Monthly gross wage, constant (2000) PTE 125,762 132,633
Annual wage increase 5,329 4,984
Promotions to higher hierarchical level (annually) 7.01% 7.75%
Employer-reported promotions (annually) 11.18% 14.55%
Job transitions to other firm (annually) 4.40% 3.43%
Female 41.16% 40.16%
Worker’s age (in years) 35.9 37.4
Tenure in the current firm (in years) 8.1 10.1
Number of workers in the firm 30 52.4
Level 1 Apprentices, interns, trainees 7.74% 5.29%
Level 2 Non-qualified professionals 10.44% 9.03%
Level 3 Semi-qualified professionals 18.27% 19.11%
Level 4 Qualified professionals 47.42% 49.88%
Level 5 Higher-qualified professionals 5.76% 6.28%
Level 6 Supervisors, team leaders, foremen 4.36% 5.03%
Level 7 Intermediary executives 2.82% 2.69%
Level 8 Top executives 3.19% 2.69%
Highest completed education
No complete primary school 2.88% 2.51%
Completed primary school (4 years of education) 42.02% 43.65%
6 years of education completed (second ciclo) 22.89% 22.63%
9 years of education completed (third ciclo) 14.10% 14.42%
High school completed (12 years of education) 13.74% 13.05%
University completed (15 to 17 years of education) 4.37% 3.74%
Number of workers 363,383 106,305
Worker-year observations 1,323,298 659,497
Note: The restricted sample contains only workers who appear in four consecutive waves
with other European countries, the level of education in Portugal is very low.5
In our sample, about 42% of the workers only completed four years of primary
education, while only about 18% of the workers finish high school. Finally, we
distinguish 18 industries. The two largest are trade and textile, clothing and
leather employing 18% and 17% of the workers, respectively.
Table 2 presents yearly job mobility by gender and age. We have categorized
transitions into five different possibilities: no change; separation to the same
hierarchical level in another firm; separation to a higher hierarchical level in
another firm; promotion inside the firm to a higher hierarchical level; and
promotion inside the firm in the same hierarchical level. The latter type of
promotions are based on the most recent promotion date reported by the firm.
The general picture does not differ much between men and women. About
80% of both men and women do not make a change. Men are slightly more
likely to switch employers, while women more often make a transition inside
the firm to a higher hierarchical level. Mobility declines as workers get older.
For the oldest age group most mobility comes from promotions inside the
5OECD (2007) states that in 2005 about 59% of the population between 25 and 64 years had not
received any education beyond primary school.
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Table 2 Frequency of yearly mobility (in percentage)
Age No Separation Transition Promotions Observations
change Same level Higher level Lower level higher level same level
Men
16–25 67.01 4.29 3.23 1.96 11.91 11.59 62,763
26–35 78.05 3.45 1.41 1.16 6.17 9.76 138,046
36–45 83.48 2.25 0.57 0.59 4.39 8.73 123,484
46 – 87.22 1.31 0.23 0.31 3.24 7.68 137,269
Total 80.73 2.61 1.08 0.86 5.61 9.12 461,562
Women
16–25 68.42 3.83 2.33 1.83 12.04 11.55 58,740
26–35 79.57 2.64 1.07 1.09 6.28 9.36 113,723
36–45 84.69 1.54 0.48 0.59 4.71 7.99 87,483
46 – 87.42 0.94 0.21 0.29 3.95 7.19 56,223
Total 80.31 2.25 0.99 0.95 6.50 9.00 316,169
All 80.56 2.45 1.05 0.90 5.97 9.07 777,731
same hierarchical level. A natural explanation that older workers are less often
promoted to higher hierarchical levels is that these workers are already in
higher hierarchical levels and there are thus fewer possibilities for increases.
McCue (1996) and Lluis (2005) have documented similar statistics for
workers’ mobility for respectively the USA and Germany. Portugal has lower
separation rates than the USA and Germany, which is particularly the case
for younger inexperienced workers. Internal job mobility rates are much
higher in Portugal. However, this might also be caused by differences in the
definition of promotions. Both McCue (1996) and Lluis (2005) use data from
questionnaires to individuals and thus rely on self-reported position changes by
workers. Furthermore, Lluis (2005) only distinguishes four hierarchical levels,
which naturally reduces mobility compared with our eight hierarchical levels.
McCue (1996) considers each self-reported position change by the worker as
a promotion, but there might still be some discrepancy between worker and
firm-reported position changes.
Table 3 presents for each hierarchical level the average wage and some mea-
sures for mobility. Except for level 6 (supervisors, team leaders and foremen),
the average wage is higher for workers in higher hierarchical levels. Workers in
Table 3 Annual mobility (in percentage) and average wage per hierarchical level
Level No change Separation Transition Transition Promotion Average
higher level lower level same level wage
Level 1 51.02 8.66 34.29 17.04 74,364
Level 2 77.52 5.92 12.80 0.89 6.89 86,548
Level 3 81.31 3.81 8.35 1.58 7.54 95,532
Level 4 81.31 4.23 2.55 1.73 9.41 117,795
Level 5 79.81 2.85 4.92 3.15 10.45 194,122
Level 6 84.92 2.42 3.39 2.87 7.37 177,693
Level 7 78.59 3.25 6.77 4.53 8.45 255,188
Level 8 82.35 3.58 3.71 10.70 361,278
Wage dynamics and promotions inside and between firms 1525
level 5 (higher-qualified professionals) are, on average, better educated than
workers in level 6, which might explain their higher average wage. Workers
in level 8 (top executives) earn, on average, more than five times as much as
apprentices and trainees in level 1. Average wages particularly start to increase
beyond level 4 (qualified professionals). Recall from Table 1 that less than 16%
of the workers are ranked in hierarchical level 5 or higher.
As could be expected, apprentices and trainees are most mobile. They are
most likely to be promoted to higher hierarchical levels, within the level or
to switch employers. The likelihood of moving to a higher hierarchical level
decreases quickly until reaching level 4, and remains roughly the same for
higher hierarchical levels. It should also be noted that from level 4 transitions
to lower levels occur more frequently particularly compared with transitions
to higher levels. Except for workers in the first level, all workers have roughly
similar probabilities of being promoted within the hierarchical level, and to
separate from the job.
Table 4 shows how workers move through hierarchical levels and the
associated wage increases. Average wage increases associated to changes in
hierarchical level are always higher than average wage increases of the workers
who stay in the same level. This also holds for promotions from level 5. Recall
that in hierarchical level 5 workers have, on average, a higher wage than in
level 6. However, the average annual wage increase for workers who move
from levels 5 to 6 is about 6.8%, while it is 4.4% for workers who stay in
level 5. It should be noted that from level 5 more workers move to level 7
than to level 6. In general, average wage increases increase in the number of
hierarchical levels a worker is promoted. However, workers are not very likely
to skip hierarchical levels beyond the level of qualified professionals (level 4).
Workers making a transition to a lower hierarchical level experience a lower
Table 4 Annual job transition matrix within and across firms
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 Level 6 Level 7 Level 8
Level 1 a 65.71 3.60 9.60 19.62 0.85 0.27 0.22 0.12
b 6.32 12.54 11.52 12.92 13.87 20.51 23.95 25.98
Level 2 0.97 86.20 5.76 6.60 0.22 0.26 0.06 0.04
–0.54 2.68 6.16 9.54 13.64 16.45 15.93 29.25
Level 3 0.69 1.63 89.30 7.53 0.42 0.46 0.09 0.05
–3.19 0.33 2.79 6.10 8.25 11.13 12.38 19.61
Level 4 0.48 0.52 1.39 95.10 1.31 0.81 0.31 0.17
–1.83 –1.26 –0.40 3.31 8.19 10.73 13.45 16.48
Level 5 0.19 0.18 0.73 3.76 90.21 1.22 2.65 1.31
–7.70 –5.97 –2.25 –0.80 4.42 6.77 8.57 12.31
Level 6 0.11 0.24 0.51 2.63 0.90 92.20 2.40 1.15
–7.40 –6.74 –4.78 –4.16 2.20 3.27 7.37 10.79
Level 7 0.08 0.07 0.32 2.15 2.65 2.11 85.84 7.31
–6.68 –34.8 –6.45 –0.69 3.56 1.22 5.30 9.65
Level 8 0.06 0.04 0.15 0.84 1.28 0.94 2.57 94.10
–25.4 –35.0 –14.7 –34.5 2.64 1.42 4.18 5.97
a Fraction of workers (%)
b Wage increase (%)
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wage increase than workers staying in their hierarchical level. Furthermore,
workers moving down to level 4 or lower, on average, experience a real wage
decrease.
Most theoretical models have labor-market experience as an important
individual characteristic (e.g. Gibbons and Waldman 1999). However, the data
do not contain information on work experience. Using potential experience
defined as the difference between age and years of schooling plus six is not
attractive. Recall that the most substantial share of the workers has only four
years of primary school. Computing potential experience implicitly assumes
that these individuals started working at age ten, which is very unlikely.
Therefore, we use the worker’s age as proxy variable for work experience,
we include both age and age squared.6 Finally, for each model specification
we estimate the model both without and with firm size, industry dummies and
dummies for the different years of observation.
We use instrumental variable methods to estimate our empirical models. It
is well known that parameter estimates may be severely biased if instruments
are weak (e.g. Staiger and Stock 1997). Therefore, we first investigate the first-
stage regressions,
(wit−1 − wit−2) − (wit−2 − wit−3) = γ10 + γ11wit−3 + γ12 pit−1 + γ13sit−1+
γ14tit−1 + γ15(xit−1 − xit−2) + 1it
(pit − pit−1) = γ20 + γ21wit−3 + γ22 pit−1 + γ23sit−1+
γ24tit−1 + γ25(xit−1 − xit−2) + 2it
(sit − sit−1) = γ30 + γ31wit−3 + γ32 pit−1 + γ33sit−1+
γ34tit−1 + γ35(xit−1 − xit−2) + 3it
(tit − tit−1) = γ40 + γ41wit−3 + γ42 pit−1 + γ43sit−1+
γ44tit−1 + γ45(xit−1 − xit−2) + 4it
(5)
Table 5 shows the parameter estimates. In all first-stage equations, all instru-
ments have substantial and significant effects on the endogenous regressors.
The F test statistics for joint significance of the instruments are much larger
than the thresholds for weak instruments mentioned in Staiger and Stock
(1997).
6Recall that our models contain fixed effects. Years of education is thus absorbed in the fixed
effect, which makes it empirically not very important if one includes (potential) work experience
or age as regressor.
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Table 5 First-stage estimation results for the dynamic panel-data models
(wit−1 − wit−2)− (pit − pit−1) (sit − sit−1) (tit − tit−1)
(wit−2 − wit−3)
Model for wage increases
Lagged wage level 0.038*** 1.28e − 08*** −3.28e − 08*** 5.91e − 07***
(wit−3) (0.002) (3.04e–09) (3.20e–09) (4.04e-08)
Lagged promotion 6, 671*** −0.987*** 0.004** 0.070***
(pit−1) (181) (0.001) (0.002) (0.014)
Lagged separation 5, 047*** 0.020*** −0.940*** 0.191***
(sit−1) (406) (0.002) (0.003) (0.015)
Lagged tenure −28.0*** −0.0005*** −0.001*** −0.005***
(tit−1) (6.5) (0.00003) (0.00004) (0.0005)
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
F test 508 1.3e+5 19,054 127
Workers 106,305 106,305 106,305 106,305
Worker-years 659,497 659,497 659,497 659,497
Models for promotions and separations
Lagged wage level 0.038*** −6.91e − 09** −3.82e − 08*** 6.36e − 07***
(wit−3) (0.002) (2.85e–09) (2.89e–09) (3.45e–08)
Lagged promotion 907*** −0.985*** 0.005*** 0.052***
(pit−2) (123) (0.001) (0.001) (0.011)
Lagged separation 581*** 0.013*** −0.944*** 0.092***
(sit−2) (182) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009)
Lagged tenure −38.0*** −0.0004*** −0.001*** −0.005***
(tit−1) (6.5) (0.00003) (0.00004) (0.0004)
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
F test 131 1.6e+5 25,591 132
Workers 106,305 106,305 106,305 106,305
Worker-years 659,497 659,497 659,497 659,497
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses
*10%, significance level
**5%, significance level
***1%, significance level
5 Results
In this section, we discuss the estimation results for the empirical models
introduced in Section 3. Table 6 presents parameter estimates for the model of
wage increases. The first two columns use transitions to a higher hierarchical
level as promotions, the last two columns use employer-reported promotion
dates. From comparing the estimation results in columns (1) and (2) with
those in columns (3) and (4), we see that the wage returns to a promotion
reported by the employer are 40% to 50% higher than the returns to a
job transition to a higher hierarchical level. Because there are only a small
number of hierarchical levels, within each hierarchical level there is most likely
a large variation in job complexity and responsibility. Recall that our data
contain eight hierarchical levels, which is more that the four levels observed by
Lluis (2005). An employer-reported promotion may thus reflect an assignment
change within a hierarchical level which can have a larger impact on the
worker’s tasks than a change in hierarchical level. Indeed less than 30% of all
changes in hierarchical levels are also considered a promotion by the employer.
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Table 6 Estimation results for dynamic panel-data model for wage increases (wit − wit−1)
 Hierarchical level Employer-reported promotion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged wage increase −0.006 0.034 −0.016 0.024
(wit−1 − wit−2) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Wage at t − 2 (wit−2) −0.031 0.010 −0.041 −0.001
(0.047) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Promotion (pit) 6,342*** 6,284*** 9,746*** 8,737***
(457) (454) (633) (536)
Separation (sit) 5,932*** 6,113*** 7,286*** 7,357***
(673) (687) (722) (725)
Tenure 7,961*** 7,325*** 8,402*** 7,684***
(1,615) (1,501) (1,665) (1,529)
Age −3,326*** −3,540*** −3,594*** −3,792***
(937) (964) (949) (973)
Age squared −32.6*** −24.6*** −33.3*** −24.9***
(5.66) (4.50) (5.95) (4.64)
Number of workers in firm 2.28*** 2.13***
(0.38) (0.38)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry, Year No Yes No Yes
Workers 106,305 106,305 106,305 106,305
Worker-years 659,497 659,497 659,497 659,497
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses
*10%, significance level
**5%, significance level
***1%, significance level
On the other hand, 40% of the employer-reported promotions do not yield a
change in job description. Recall that the data include over 60,000 different job
descriptions. We interpret this as indication that some employers report wage
increases as promotions rather than changes in job tasks or responsibilities.
However, the raw data show that an employer-reported promotion which
does not involve a change in job description only yields a wage increase of
60% of a promotion that coincides with a change in job description. These
findings coincide with Pergamit and Veum (1999) who show the sensitivity of
empirical results on job assignments and wage increases to different promotion
definitions. Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth they conclude
that for a substantial fraction of individuals a promotion does not mean a
change of position. Overall, after a self-reported promotion about 30% of the
workers remain to perform the same tasks as before.
Job transitions to higher hierarchical levels raise wages with, on average,
about 6,300 PTE. Recall that in case of full information the promotion only
reflects a change in production technology, which is not yet captured by
indicators for hierarchical levels. Since 6,300 PTE is around 5% of the average
wage in our data, the wage returns to promotions seem quite large. Waldman
(1984) argues that in the presence of asymmetric learning wage increases upon
promotions should be substantial. Our estimate is in line with earlier empirical
work. McCue (1996) concludes that promotions account approximately for
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9–18% of within-firm wage growth over the life cycle. Booth et al. (2003) find
a wage prize for promotions of around 5%. And Lima and Pereira (2003)
find, using the same data we use, for firms with more than 500 workers a
wage increase of 1.9% for a promotion inside the same level, 4.9% for a job
transition to a higher hierarchical level, and 8.3% for a job transition to a
higher hierarchical level that coincides with an employer-reported promotion.
We do not find evidence for serial correlation in wage increases (after
controlling for worker heterogeneity). The coefficient for wit−1 − wit−2 is
very small and insignificant. This is robust against different measures for
promotions, and including firm characteristics. This is an indication for full
information as discussed in Gibbons and Waldman (1999). Also the coefficient
for wit−2 is small and insignificant in all specifications. this implies that we
also do not find evidence in favor of learning as discussed by Chiappori et
al. (1999). Recall that they exploit the presence of downward wage rigidities.
Such wage rigidities are quite strong in the Portuguese labor market, which
is considered to be highly regulated and lowering nominal wages is illegal. It
should, however, be noted that our observation period was characterized by
high wage growth.
Serial correlation in wage increases is one of the stylized facts summarized
by Baker et al. (1994b), but has mixed evidence in the empirical literature.
Also, Lluis (2005) did not find evidence of serial correlation in wages, while
Table 7 Estimation results for dynamic panel-data model for promotions (pit)
 Hierarchical level Employer-reported promotion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged wage increase −1.49e − 06*** −9.60e − 07*** 1.88e − 06*** 1.23e − 06***
(wit−1 − wit−2) (2.35e–07) (1.59e–07) (2.99e–07) (2.14e–07)
Wage at t − 2 (wit−2) −1.44e − 06*** −9.18e − 07*** 1.89e − 06*** 1.27e − 06***
(2.30e–07) (1.54e–07) (2.91e–07) (2.08e–07)
Promotion at t − 1 (pit−1) 0.039*** 0.038*** −0.006 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Separation at t − 1 (sit−1) −0.010*** −0.011*** −0.032*** −0.032***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Tenure 0.082*** 0.066*** −0.088*** −0.076***
(0.013) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012)
Age 0.025*** 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.024***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Age squared −0.0009*** −0.0008*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
(0.00005) (0.00003) (0.00006) (0.00004)
Number of workers in firm 0.00001*** −0.00002***
(1.62e–06) (2.17e–06)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry, Year No Yes No Yes
Workers 106,305 106,305 106,305 106,305
Worker-years 659,497 659,497 659,497 659,497
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses
*10%, significance level
**5%, significance level
***1%, significance level
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Gibbs and Hendricks (2004) and Dohmen (2004) found some evidence for
serial correlation in wages. However, Dohmen (2004) controls for performance
rating by the employer, which changes the interpretation of this result. Many
studies investigating serial correlations in wage increases (e.g. Chiappori et al.
1999) do not control for promotions of workers. As mentioned above a promo-
tion yields a substantial wage increase. If wage increases predict promotions
(due to symmetric learning), we underestimate the serial correlation in wage
increases. Estimating our model again without controlling for promotions
shows that the coefficients are almost unaffected. For specification (1) in
Table 6 the coefficient for serial correlation in wage increases becomes 0.004
instead of −0.006, and for specification (2) it changes from 0.034 to 0.043.
In all specifications a substantial wage premium is associated to switching
employers. The wage premium is higher in specifications (3) and (4) than in
specifications (1) and (2). The main reason is that if the worker moves to
a higher hierarchical level while switching employers, then in specifications
(1) and (2) it is recorded as both a promotion and a job separation while in
specification (3) and (4) it is only recorded as a job transition. Substantial
returns to job-to-job transitions may either imply that learning is asymmetric
or that the labor market is not competitive or frictionless. If received signals
are different for poaching firms than for the current employer like in the
framework of Pinkston (2009), job-to-job transitions are associated to wage
Table 8 Estimation results for dynamic panel-data model for separations (sit)
 Hierarchical level Employer-reported promotion
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged wage increase −2.14e − 08 −4.89e − 08 −2.46e − 08 −5.04e − 08
(wit−1 − wit−2) (1.47e–07) (1.10e–07) (1.50e–07) (1.10e–07)
Wage at t − 2 (wit−2) 1.09e − 09 −2.18e − 08 −8.03e − 10 −2.29e − 08
(1.43e−07) (1.05e−07) (1.45e−07) (1.06e–07)
Promotion at t − 1 (pit−1) 0.003* 0.003 0.004** 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Separation at t − 1 (sit−1) 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Tenure 0.013* 0.006 0.013 0.006
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
Age −0.005 −0.001 −0.006 −0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Age squared −0.00005* −0.00004** −0.00005* −0.00004**
(0.00003) (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00002)
Number of workers in firm 7.17e − 07 6.74e − 07
(1.08e−06) (1.08e−06)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry, Year No Yes No Yes
Workers 106,305 106,305 106,305 106,305
Worker-years 659,497 659,497 659,497 659,497
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses
*10%, significance level
**5%, significance level
***1%, significance level
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increases. Also the model of Scoones and Bernhardt (1998) predicts wage
increases upon job-to-job transitions. In their model, job-to-job transitions are
associated to promotions (from laborer to manager). Therefore, a substantial
fraction of the wage increase is due to change in hierarchical level. However,
also in columns (1) and (2) where we take account of changes in hierarchical
levels at job-to-job transitions, the wage increase is still very substantial.
Indeed, also job-search theory predicts that workers move to better paying
firms (e.g. Burdett and Mortensen 1998). Raw statistics confirm that larger
firms pay, on average, higher wages, which is consistent with job-search theory.
Firm size and industry dummies can also be interpreted as indicators for the
firm’s production technology. Indeed, as is shown in specifications (2) and (4)
wage increases are significantly larger in firms with more workers. However,
wage increases following job separations remain unaffected after controlling
for firm size and industry dummies. This implies that the wage increase after
a job separation cannot be explained only from workers moving to firms with
better production technologies. Finally, wage increases increase substantially
in job tenure, but decrease in the worker’s age. This might imply that job tenure
is more relevant to employers than overall labor-market experience. This is
consistent with Jovanovic (1979), who stressed the importance of a good match
between employer and worker.
Table 9 Estimation results (only years after 1993) for dynamic panel-data model for wage
increases (wit − wit−1)
 Hierarchical level Employer-reported promotion
(1) (2)
Lagged wage increase (wit−1 − wit−2) 0.024 0.005
(0.073) (0.071)
Wage at t − 2 (wit−2) −0.001 −0.021
(0.068) (0.067)
Promotion (pit) 5,847*** 9,412***
(631) (756)
Separation (sit) 10,129*** 11,551***
(1,350) (1,420)
Tenure 14,860*** 15,908***
(3,732) (3,901)
Age −7,914*** −8,406***
(2,222) (2,292)
Age squared −48.2*** −51.6***
(11.1) (11.8)
Number of workers in firm 1.30*** 1.16***
(0.27) (0.28)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes
Industry, Year Yes Yes
Workers 106,305 106,305
Worker-years 529,919 529,919
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses
*10%, significance level
**5%, significance level
***1%, significance level
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Table 7 presents parameter estimates for promotion rates. Wage increases
have a negative impact on transitions to higher hierarchical levels, i.e. in
specifications (1) and (2) the most recent wage increase has a significantly
negative coefficient. In specifications (3) and (4) wage variables do have
positive effects on the probability that employers report promotions, and these
effects are significant. In specifications (1) and (2) there is positive serial
correlation in promotions, which is absent when promotions are reported by
the employer.
The results thus provide very mixed evidence for learning. Serial correlation
in promotion rates present in columns (1) and (2) can be the result of
symmetric learning. However, Gibbons and Waldman (1999) also predict that
in the presence of symmetric learning the most recent wage increase should
predict promotions, which is only the case in columns (3) and (4). According to
Chiappori et al. (1999) the coefficient for the recent wage increase wit−1 − wit−2
should exceed the coefficient of the wage level wit−2 in the presence of
symmetric learning, which is not true in any specification. More precisely, the
coefficient for wit−1 − wit−2 has about the same size as the coefficient for wit−2.
So, only the wage level wit−1 is important for explaining promotions. Workers
with a higher wage level wit−1 are thus less likely to change hierarchical level,
but it is more likely that their employer reports a promotion. This provides
some evidence that both promotion concept are substantially different.
Table 10 Estimation results (only years after 1993) for dynamic panel-data model for promo-
tions (pit)
 Hierarchical level Employer-reported promotion
(1) (2)
Lagged wage increase (wit−1 − wit−2) −1.21e − 06*** 2.30e − 06***
(3.14e−07) (3.93e−07)
Wage at t − 2 (wit−2) −1.18e − 06*** 2.35e − 06***
(3.12e−07) (3.88e−07)
Promotion at t − 1 (pit−1) 0.033*** 0.005
(0.003) (0.004)
Separation at t − 1 (sit−1) 0.002 −0.034***
(0.007) (0.007)
Tenure 0.130*** −0.115***
(0.031) (0.034)
Age −0.016 0.046**
(0.020) (0.020)
Age squared −0.0009*** 0.0005***
(0.00008) (0.00009)
Number of workers in firm 2.04e−06 −0.00002***
(1.80e−06) (2.65e−06)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes
Industry, Year Yes Yes
Workers 106,305 106,305
Worker-years 529,919 529,919
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses
*10%, significance level
**5%, significance level
***1%, significance level
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Workers switching employers have significantly lower promotion rates in
the next year. The impact of a job separation on the promotion probability
is almost three times as large in specification (3) and (4) as in specifications
(1) and (2). In a frictionless labor market with symmetric learning (or full
information), job separations should not affect promotion rates. Kahn (2007)
and Schönberg (2007) argue that in the presence of asymmetric learning there
is adverse selection in employer transitions, which might be expressed in
the negative impact of job separations on promotion rates. An alternative
explanation might be that within the first year at a new firm a worker is
unlikely to be promoted. This is particularly true if learning about the quality
of a match is important (e.g. Jovanovic 1979). Job tenure has a positive and
significant impact on changing hierarchical level, while it has a significantly
negative effect on employer-reported promotions. The substantial differences
in the estimated coefficients again indicate that changes in hierarchical levels
and employer-reported promotions are substantially different measures for
inside firm mobility.
Table 8 shows parameter estimates for the model describing job separations.
In all four specifications, wages do not significantly affect separations. This is
not in agreement with job-search theory, which argues that in the presence
of search frictions the wage (wit−1) should have a negative impact on job
Table 11 Estimation results (only years after 1993) for dynamic panel-data model for separa-
tions (sit)
 Hierarchical level Employer-reported promotion
(1) (2)
Lagged wage increase (wit−1 − wit−2) −5.53e − 07*** −5.59e − 07***
(1.93e−07) (1.94e−07)
Wage at t − 2 (wit−2) −5.36e−07*** −5.40e−07***
(1.88e−07) (1.90e−07)
Promotion at t − 1 (pit−1) 0.002 0.004**
(0.003) (0.002)
Separation at t − 1 (sit−1) 0.025*** 0.026***
(0.006) (0.006)
Tenure 0.055*** 0.056***
(0.018) (0.018)
Age −0.022** −0.022**
(0.011) (0.011)
Age squared −0.0002*** −0.0002***
(0.00004) (0.00004)
Number of workers in firm −3.15e−06** −3.13e−06**
(1.34e−06) (1.34e−06)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes
Industry, Year Yes Yes
Workers 106,305 106,305
Worker-years 529,919 529,919
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses
*10%, significance level
**5%, significance level
***1%, significance level
1534 B. van der Klaauw, A. Dias da Silva
Table 12 Estimation results (by gender) for dynamic panel-data model for wage increases (wit −
wit−1)
 Hierarchical level Employer-reported promotion
Female Male Female Male
Lagged wage increase −0.076* 0.058 −0.081* 0.044
(wit−1 − wit−2) (0.043) (0.070) (0.043) (0.068)
Wage at t − 2 (wit−2) −0.078* 0.023 −0.084* 0.010
(0.043) (0.065) (0.043) (0.063)
Promotion (pit) 4,153*** 7,514*** 6,077*** 10,204***
(408) (711) (375) (864)
Separation (sit) 3,560*** 7,596*** 4,323*** 9,145***
(708) (1035) (711) (1107)
Tenure 5,159*** 8,321*** 5,142*** 8,968***
(1,884) (2,043) (1,907) (2,097)
Age −2556** −3463** −2554** −3,910***
(1,079) (1,341) (1,081) (1362)
Age squared −14.9** −32.9*** −14.5** −33.6***
(6.12) (6.40) (6.27) (6.65)
Number of workers in firm 1.42*** 2.73*** 1.25*** 2.64***
(0.30) (0.58) (0.30) (0.59)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry, Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Workers 43,509 62,915 43,509 62,915
Worker-years 264,839 394,658 264,839 394,658
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses
*10%, significance level
**5%, significance level
***1%, significance level
mobility. Also promotions do not have a large effect. In all case the effect
is very small, and becomes also insignificant once we control for firm size,
industry dummies and year indicators.7 Waldman (1984) argues that if there is
asymmetric employer learning, promotions are signals to outside firms about
the worker’s ability. However, upon promotion the current firm should offer
a substantial wage increase to avoid the worker from leaving the firm. If firms
correctly do so, also in the presence of asymmetric learning promotions do not
forecast job-to-job mobility.
There is a significant positive serial correlation in job separations, which is
in accordance with model predictions of Ghosh (2007) and Schönberg (2007).
Tenure does not significantly affect job separations. This does not coincide
with the model of Jovanovic (1979) in which workers and employers learn
about the quality of the match. However, if all learning takes place in the first
year after establishing the match, this effect is absorbed in the serial correlation
in job-to-job transitions. So our results might indicate that learning about the
quality of the match might be important, but only if such learning is a relatively
7The results remain similar if we exclude individual in the first hierarchical level (apprentices,
interns and trainees).
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short process. Young workers are most mobile, and the likelihood of switching
employers decreases during working life. These are well known results, for
example, Topel and Ward (1992) showed that the most substantial share of job
mobility is in the first ten years of a career.
To summarize the main conclusions from our empirical analyses. Full
information about worker’s ability in a competitive and frictionless labor
market seems to be rejected. There are substantial wage returns to promotions
and job-to-job transitions. There is only very limited evidence in favor of
symmetric learning. We do not find serial correlation in wage increases and
employer-reported promotions as predicted by Gibbons and Waldman (1999),
but there is serial correlation is changes in hierarchical levels and wage in-
creases forecast employer-reported promotions. We also do not find the serial
correlation predicted by Chiappori et al. (1999). Symmetric learning alone thus
cannot explain our empirical findings. Although our results share features of
the model of Jovanovic (1979), in which workers search for a good match.
However, we observe large wage returns to both promotions and job-to-job
transitions, which may indicate asymmetric learning. But there is no single
model of asymmetric learning which is consistent with all our findings. The
large return to job-to-job transitions may be explained by job-search models,
but wages do not affect job-to-job transitions.
Table 13 Estimation results (by gender) for dynamic panel-data model for promotions (pit)
 Hierarchical level Employer-reported promotion
Female Male Female Male
Lagged wage increase −1.57e−06*** −8.81e−07*** 1.28e−06*** 1.36e−06***
(wit−1 − wit−2) (3.17e−07) (1.91e−07) (3.51e−07) (2.89e−07)
Wage at t − 2 (wit−2) −1.57e−06*** −8.25e−07*** 1.45e−06*** 1.33e−06***
(3.17e−07) (1.83e−07) (3.50e−07) (2.79e−07)
Promotion at t − 1 (pit−1) 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.035*** −0.019***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005)
Separation at t − 1 (sit−1) −0.018*** −0.006 −0.022*** −0.037***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
Tenure 0.105*** 0.045*** −0.049*** −0.091***
(0.020) (0.011) (0.018) (0.016)
Age 0.003 0.050*** 0.007 0.031***
(0.012) (0.006) (0.011) (0.009)
Age squared −0.0009*** −0.0008*** 0.0003*** 0.0004***
(0.00007) (0.00004) (0.00006) (0.00006)
Number of workers in firm 8.42e−06*** 0.00001*** −0.00001*** −0.00002***
(1.85e−06) (2.17e−06) (2.53e−06) (3.30e−06)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector, Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Workers 43,509 62,915 43,509 62,915
Worker-years 264,839 394,658 264,839 394,658
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses
*10%, significance level
**5%, significance level
***1%, significance level
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6 Sensitivity analyses
In this section, we perform some additional analyses to investigate the robust-
ness of our empirical results. Firstly, the models we have estimated are all
just identified, i.e. for each endogenous regressors there is one instrumental
variable. Given the length of our observation period, we can easily construct
more instrumental variables by using additional lags, which allows to use
Sargan tests. When using one additional lag for each instrument, the Sargan
test does not reject the model specification for the models for wage increases.
However, the Sargan tests reject the models for promotions. The latter is not
very surprising as the validity of the Sargan tests depend on homoskedasticity
of the error terms. By definition, error terms are heteroskedastic in linear
probability models. For the models for job separations, the p values of the
Sargan tests are slightly above 0.10.
Next, we stratify the data in a number of different ways, and we estimate
the models for wage increases, promotions and separations using the different
subsamples. In the tables, we only report estimation results of the most
extensive models, i.e. those including firm size and industry and year dummies
as covariates.
Recall that until 1993 data were collected in March, while from 1994
onwards the data were collected in October. Between the 1993-wave and the
Table 14 Estimation results (by gender) for dynamic panel-data model for separations (sit)
 Hierarchical level Employer-reported promotion
Female Male Female Male
Lagged wage increase −1.69e−07 −5.61e−09 −1.69e−07 −6.88e−09
(wit−1 − wit−2) (1.88e−07) (1.46e−07) (1.89e−07) (1.47e−07)
Wage at t − 2 (wit−2) −1.36e−07 1.77e−08 −1.35e−07 1.68e−08
(1.87e−07) (1.38e−07) (1.88e−07) (1.39e−07)
Promotion at t − 1 (pit−1) 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Separation at t − 1 (sit−1) 0.026*** 0.020*** 0.027*** 0.020***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Tenure 0.011 0.003 0.011 0.003
(0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008)
Age −0.007 0.004 −0.007 0.003
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Age squared −0.00002 −0.00006** −0.00002 −0.00006**
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (.00003)
Number of workers in firm −5.80e−07 8.74e−07 −6.41e−07 8.53e−07
(9.91e−07) (1.65e−06) (9.95e−07) (1.65e−06)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry, Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Workers 43,509 62,915 43,509 62,915
Worker-years 264,839 394,658 264,839 394,658
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses
*10%, significance level
**5%, significance level
***1%, significance level
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1994-wave more promotions and higher wage increases might have occurred
due to the extended time period. Even though we included year dummies,
this might have biased our parameter estimates. Therefore, as a first sensitivity
check we estimate our models only using data collected after 1993. Although
the coefficients in the model for wage increases change somewhat, the main
results remain the same (see Table 9). Serial correlation in wage increases
remains absent, and there are substantial returns to promotions and job
separations. However, the wage premium from a job separation increases with
about 40% compared with the earlier estimates. Also the effects of tenure
increase, which is compensated by a more negative age effect. The estimation
results for the promotion probability do not change much (see Tables 10).
We find some differences for the model for separation. The workers wage
becomes significant. In particular, individuals with a higher wage Wit−1 are
less likely to change employer (see Table 11). This is consistent with standard
job-search models. This prediction could also be generated in models where
workers search for a good match. But these models predict a negative effect
of tenure, while we find a significantly positive effect. However, there remains
serial correlation in job-to-job transitions.
We also perform separate analyses for men and women. Men and women
might sort into different occupations or jobs, and, therefore, career profiles
Table 15 Estimation results (by years of education) for dynamic panel-data model for wage
increases (wit − wit−1)
 Hierarchical level Employer-reported promotion
<= 4 years 6 − 9 years > 9 years <= 4 years 6 − 9 years > 9 years
Lagged wage increase −0.166 −0.121 0.283* −0.190 −0.143 0.287*
(wit−1 − wit−2) (0.156) (0.092) (0.167) (0.152) (0.089) (0.168)
Wage at t − 2 (wit−2) −0.177 −0.139 0.215 −0.201 −0.161* 0.215
(0.158) (0.090) (0.144) (0.154) (0.087) (0.144)
Promotion (pit) 3,761*** 4,668*** 12,291*** 4,824*** 6,561*** 14,795***
(796) (694) (2,089) (868) (769) (2,284)
Separation (sit) 1,598** 2,898*** 23,612*** 2,128*** 3,840*** 26,558***
(649) (784) (4,312) (653) (825) (4,703)
Tenure 4,814*** 6,047*** 557 4754*** 6,194*** 1413
(1,247) (1588) (5453) (1,248) (1,595) (5,548)
Age −1,370* −2381** −978 −1,319* −2,499** −1,875
(709) (987) (4,015) (699) (980) (4,099)
Age squared −16.8*** −19.4** −18.7 −16.1*** −18.4** −18.1
(4.0) (7.7) (19.5) (4.0) (7.6) (19.8)
Number of 2.03*** 1.77*** 0.872 1.88*** 1.61*** 0.617
workers in firm (0.464) (0.378) (0.761) (0.467) (0.375) (0.749)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry, Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Workers 48,578 39,500 18,317 48,578 39,500 18,317
Worker-years 304,470 244,390 110,637 304,470 244,390 110,637
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses
*10%, significance level
**5%, significance level
***1%, significance level
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may differ. Table 12 shows that the estimated coefficients for wage increases,
indeed, differ somewhat between men and women. Although the difference
is mainly in the size of the coefficients rather than significance or sign. In
particular, returns to both promotions and job separations are much larger
for men than for women. The results for promotion rates do not differ much
between men and women as can be seen in Table 13. The results are also quite
similar to the results for the full population. The same holds for the model for
separations (Table 14).
Next, we consider the worker’s education. Education is often considered a
signal for ability (e.g. Altonji and Pierret 2001; DeVaro and Waldman 2006;
Schönberg 2007). Furthermore, workers with different educational levels sort
into different job types. We distinguish workers with only completed primary
education (low education), workers who completed the second or third ciclo
(medium education), and workers who completed high school or more (high
education).
As can be seen from Table 15, for none of the educational groups we find
serial correlation in wage increases. The wage increase upon promotion is
significant for all groups, but much higher for workers with high education
Table 16 Estimation results (by years of education) for dynamic panel-data model for promo-
tions (pit)
 Hierarchical level Employer-reported promotion
<= 4 years 6−9 years > 9 years <= 4 years 6−9 years > 9 years
Lagged wage −6.88e−06*** −8.82e−07* −1.39e−07 8.27e−07 3.05e−06*** 6.44e−07
increase (1.18e−06) (4.59e−07) (2.16e−07) (1.36e−06) (6.49e−07) (4.40e−07)
(wit−1 − wit−2)
Wage at t − 2 −6.87e−06*** −8.70e−07* −1.19e−07 7.97e−07 3.14e−06*** 7.27e−07*
(wit−2) (1.19e−06) (4.52e−07) (2.03e−07) (1.37e−06) (6.39e−07) (4.24e−07)
Promotion at 0.024*** 0.045*** 0.034*** 0.057*** 0.009 −0.076***
t − 1 (pit−1) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010)
Separation at −0.013** −0.019*** −0.017* −0.015*** −0.021*** −0.078***
t − 1 (sit−1) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.015)
Tenure 0.035*** 0.018** 0.019 −0.042*** −0.049*** −0.202**
(0.010) (0.008) (0.043) (0.009) (0.011) (0.093)
Age 0.040*** 0.073*** 0.073** 0.015** 0.0006 0.102*
(0.007) (0.006) (0.029) (0.006) (0.007) (0.060)
Age squared −0.0005*** −0.0008*** −0.0009*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0008***
(0.00004) (0.00005) (0.0001) (0.00003) (0.00006) (0.0003)
Number of 0.00001*** 2.63e−06** 1.99e−06 −0.00002*** −0.00001** −0.00001*
workers in firm (2.81e−06) (1.28e−06) (3.09e−06) (3.53e−06) (2.32e−06) (6.77e−06)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry, Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Workers 48,578 39,500 18,317 48,578 39,500 18,317
Worker-years 304,470 244,390 110,637 304,470 244,390 110,637
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses
*10%, significance level
**5%, significance level
***1%, significance level
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than for both other groups. This seems to contradict DeVaro and Waldman
(2006), who argue that in the presence of asymmetric employer learning wage
increases due to promotions should be decreasing in the level of education.
The reason is that the signal of promotions is strongest for low-educated
workers. Promotions for low-educated workers are, therefore, rare, and should
be accompanied by substantial wage increases to avoid outside firms from
attracting the worker. However, average wage levels are 106,664 PTE for
low-educated, 130,103 PTE for medium-educated, and 209,689 PTE for high-
educated workers. As fraction of average wage, wage increases upon promo-
tions are thus only much higher for the high-educated workers. Recall that
educational levels are much lower in Portugal than in the USA. DeVaro and
Waldman (2006) consider high-school graduates as the lowest educational
level, while in our classification these are high educated.
Workers with high education benefit most from switching employers. The
premium associated to an employer change is almost twice the wage increase
of a promotion. For both other groups, the wage increase upon switching
employers is much smaller than the returns of a promotion. These results
may imply that the market for low-educated workers has smaller frictions.
Table 17 Estimation results (by years of education) for dynamic panel-data model for separa-
tions (sit)
 Hierarchical level Employer-reported promotion
<= 4 years 6−9 years > 9 years <= 4 years 6−9 years > 9 years
Lagged wage −8.81e−07 6.19e−08 3.13e−07 −9.09e−07 6.32e−08 3.23e−07*
increase (6.93e−07) (3.34e−07) (1.90e−07) (6.95e−07) (3.33e−07) (1.92e−07)
(wit−1 − wit−2)
Wage at t − 2 −8.56e−07 6.77e−08 3.56e−07** −8.83e−07 6.99e−08 3.60e−07**
(wit−2) (6.98e−07) (3.24e−07) (1.78e−07) (7.00e−07) (3.24e−07) (1.79e−07)
Promotion at 0.004 −0.003 0.012** 0.005** 0.0002 −0.001
t − 1 (pit−1) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Separation at 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.023** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.025**
t − 1 (sit−1) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010)
Age 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.023) (0.004) (0.004) (0.024)
Age squared −0.00008*** −0.00002 −0.00003 −0.00008*** −0.00003 −7.00e−06
(0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00009) (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.0001)
Tenure 0.010 −0.004 −0.007 0.010 −0.004 −0.009
(0.006) (0.006) (0.035) (0.006) (0.006) (0.036)
Number of 2.91e−06 −1.58e−06* −3.94e−07 2.82e−06 −1.54e−06 −5.13e−07
workers in firm (1.82e−06) (9.50e−07) (2.50e−06) (1.81e−06) (9.50e−07) (2.53e−06)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry, Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Workers 48,578 39,500 18,317 48,578 39,500 18,317
Worker-years 304,470 244,390 110,637 304,470 244,390 110,637
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses
*10%, significance level
**5%, significance level
***1%, significance level
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An alternative explanation is that wages for low-educated workers are largely
arranged by collective bargaining agreements, and that, therefore, switching
employer does not yield large wage increases. High-educated workers may
self-select in markets with more job-search frictions, and where asymmetric
employer learning is more important. Recall that schooling levels are low in
Portugal and, therefore, high-educated workers may be scarce. This might also
explain the existence of search frictions for highly educated labor.
For all educational levels, we find serial correlation in promotion rates if
promotions are measured as changes in hierarchical levels (see Table 16).
Also workers who switched employers, are less likely to get promoted in the
following year. For the low-educated workers, there is a significant negative
relation between wage increases and changing hierarchical level, which is
absent for the medium and high-educated workers. Finally, for all groups we
find significant serial correlation in job separation rates (see Table 17). Other
covariates, except age, do not seem important in explaining job separations.
So although the magnitude of the coefficients differs between groups, the
results of the separate groups are consistent with the results for the complete
sample.
Table 18 Estimation results (by sector) for dynamic panel-data model for wage increases (wit −
wit−1)
 Hierarchical level Employer-reported promotion
Construction Financial Construction Financial
Lagged wage increase 0.775*** 0.038 0.788*** 0.045
(wit−1 − wit−2) (0.216) (0.210) (0.218) (0.210)
Wage at t − 2 (wit−2) 0.748*** 0.001 0.760*** −0.001
(0.215) (0.201) (0.217) (0.198)
Promotion (pit) 12,548*** 12,812*** 7,533*** 14,103***
(2,102) (4,450) (1,976) (2,894)
Separation (sit) 5,901 42,382*** 7,023 46,719***
(5,176) (11,050) (5,187) (12,008)
Age −2,944 757 −2,529 133
(11,906) (3,992) (11,908) (4,037)
Age squared 11.1 −11.8 22.4 −12.4
(20.8) (14.2) (20.9) (14.7)
Tenure 1877 −544 36.7 99.9
(15,501) (3,380) (15,460) (3,356)
Number of workers in firm −1.82 2.08 −1.75 1.89
(3.58) (1.29) (3.53) (1.29)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Workers 8,024 5,180 8,024 5,180
Worker-years 49,950 36,587 49,950 36,587
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses
*10%, significance level
**5%, significance level
***1%, significance level
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Table 19 Estimation results (by sector) for dynamic panel-data model for promotions (pit)
 Hierarchical level Employer-reported promotion
Construction Financial Construction Financial
Lagged wage increase −8.82e − 07 2.23e − 06* 4.13e − 07 −2.97e − 06
(wit−1 − wit−2) (5.75e − 07) (1.33e − 06) (7.21e − 07) (2.82e − 06)
Wage at t − 2 (wit−2) −8.33e − 07 2.09e − 06* 4.25e − 07 −2.48e − 06
(5.70e − 07) (1.22e − 06) (7.15e − 07) (2.57e − 06)
Promotion at t − 1 (pit−1) 0.031*** 0.025** 0.059*** −0.071***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011)
Separation at t − 1 (sit−1) 0.022 0.026 −0.034 −0.224∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.031) (0.022) (0.066)
Age −0.026 −0.125 0.016 0.256
(0.079) (0.116) (0.099) (0.248)
Age squared −0.0008*** −0.0008*** 0.00008 0.0004
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.003)
Tenure 0.135 0.199* −0.027 −0.273
(0.095) (0.115) (0.119) (0.246)
Number of workers in firm −0.00001 −0.00004∗ −2.28e − 06 0.00006
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00005)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Workers 8,024 5,180 8,024 5,180
Worker-years 49,950 36,587 49,950 36,587
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses
*10%, significance level
**5%, significance level
***1%, significance level
Next, we consider two specific sectors, construction and banking and insur-
ances. Our idea is that construction is largely dominated by blue-collar work-
ers, while the banking and insurance sector is mainly a white-collar sector.8
So by comparing the model estimates for those sectors, we can learn more
about what drives dynamics for different types of workers. Table 18 shows that
in the financial sector wage increases are not serially correlated, while in the
construction sector a wage increase wit − wit−1 mainly depends on the current
wage wit−1. This might indicate that learning is more important in the construc-
tion sector. For both sectors we find substantial returns to promotions. Only
in the financial sector there are significant wage increases at job separations.
The latter might imply that the labor market in the construction sector is more
competitive. Table 19 shows the results for the model for promotions. The
main conclusion is that there is some serial correlation in promotions (although
negatively for employer-reported promotions in the financial sector). Finally,
Table 20 shows the results for the model for separations. For both sectors we
do not find any significant effects, which might suggest that the labor markets
in both sectors are rather competitive. The results for the construction sector
are thus to some extent consistent with symmetric learning in a competitive
market. While in the financial sector, it might be the case that learning is more
8Our data do not contain any indicator for being a blue or white-collar worker.
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asymmetric. One may argue that for a competing firm it is easier to observe
the productivity of a construction workers than of a banker or an employee in
an insurance company.
Finally, Jovanovic (1979) stresses the importance of the quality of the match
between the worker and the firm. In our empirical analyses we have included
only worker fixed effects which remain the same also when workers switch
jobs. If, indeed, the quality of the job is important, the worker specific effect
may change when changing jobs. We perform a sensitivity analysis in which we
allow for worker-firm fixed effects. This implies that we can no longer consider
job separations. Therefore, we only focus on the models for wage increases
and promotions and only use spells of workers staying within the same job to
estimate these models.
Table 21 shows the parameter estimates for the model for wage increases.
Like in the baseline model there is no serial correlation in wage increases, but
the returns to promotions are slightly lower. The coefficients of the age effect
differ somewhat. But it should be noted that in the baseline model we can
distinguish between age and tenure, which is not possible when considering job
match fixed effects. Finally, the coefficient of firm size is much smaller. But in
this specification it is identified only from variation in the firm size between
years, while in the baseline model also firm size variation of workers changing
Table 20 Estimation results (by sector) for dynamic panel-data model for separations (sit)
 Hierarchical level Employer-reported promotion
Construction Financial Construction Financial
Lagged wage increase 3.02e − 07 1.07e − 07 2.98e − 07 1.12e − 07
(wit−1 − wit−2) (4.82e − 07) (6.27e − 07) (4.83e − 07) (6.20e − 07)
Wage at t − 2 (wit−2) 3.20e − 07 1.00e − 07 3.17e − 07 1.07e − 07
(4.78e − 07) (5.75e − 07) (4.79e − 07) (5.66e − 07)
Promotion at t − 1 (pit−1) 0.0085 −0.0007 0.011 0.0006
(0.0069) (0.005) (0.009) (0.0023)
Separation at t − 1 (sit−1) 0.012 −0.013 0.013 −0.013
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Age 0.0007 0.034 0.001 0.034
(0.066) (0.055) (0.066) (0.055)
Age squared −0.00015* −0.00003 −0.00014* −0.00003
(0.00008) (0.00006) (0.00008) (0.00007)
Tenure 0.015 −0.032 0.015 −0.032
(0.080) (0.054) (0.080) (0.054)
Number of workers in firm 0.00002 0.00001 0.00002 0.00001
(0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00001)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Workers 8,024 5,180 8,024 5,180
Worker-years 49,950 36,587 49,950 36,587
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses
*10%, significance level
**5%, significance level
***1%, significance level
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Table 21 Estimation results (including worker-firm fixed effects) for dynamic panel data model
for wage increases (wit − wit−1)
 Hierarchical level Employer-reported promotion
(1) (2)
Lagged wage increase (wit−1 − wit−2) 0.024 0.018
(0.035) (0.035)
Wage at t−2 (wit−2) 0.008 0.002
(0.033) (0.033)
Promotion (pit) 5,504*** 7,937***
(370) (380)
Age 709*** 685***
(245) (245)
Age squared −3.47* −3.12
(2.09) (2.09)
Number of workers in firm 0.28*** 0.08
(0.06) (0.06)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes
Industry, Year Yes Yes
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses
*10%, significance level
**5%, significance level
***1%, significance level
jobs adds to the identification. Table 22 presents the results for the promotion
model. Again, we find serial correlation in changes in hierarchical levels and
wage increases predict employer-reported promotions. However, the latter
effect is somewhat smaller when accounting for match-specific effects.
Table 22 Estimation results (including worker-firm fixed effects) for dynamic panel data model
for promotions (pit)
 Hierarchical level Employer-reported promotion
(1) (2)
Lagged wage increase (wit−1 − wit−2) −1.94e − 07** 6.82e − 07***
(9.73e−08) (1.45e−07)
Wage at t−2 (wit−2) −1.66e − 07* 7.23e − 07***
(9.27e−07) (1.40e−07)
Promotion at t − 1 (pit−1) 0.029*** 0.007*
(0.002) (0.004)
Age 0.065*** −0.024***
(0.002) (0.002)
Age squared −0.0006*** 0.0002***
(0.00002) (0.00002)
Number of workers in firm 5.94e−07 −3.66e − 06***
(4.80e−07) (1.49e−06)
Hierarchical level Yes Yes
Industry, Year Yes Yes
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses
*10%, significance level
**5%, significance level
***1%, significance level
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed dynamic relations between wage increases, pro-
motions and employer changes. In the empirical analyses, we have used two
definitions for promotions available in the Portuguese-matched employer–
employee data Quadros de Pessoal, which are also often used in the literature.
Firstly, promotions defined as changes in hierarchical levels. Secondly, we used
employer-reported promotions. Wage returns to both types of promotions
are substantial, although an employer-reported promotion yields 30% higher
returns. This suggests that hierarchical levels are too broadly defined in
terms of job complexity and responsibility. However, 40% of the employer-
reported promotions do not yield a change in very precisely defined job
descriptions. Even though employer-reported promotions involving a change
in job description yield higher wage returns, the wage returns to employer-
reported promotions which are not associated to a change in job description
are substantial. We interpret this as evidence that employers not only consider
changes in job tasks as promotions, but also report substantial wage increases
as promotions.
Our empirical results show substantial returns to promotions and job-to-job
transitions. This implies that full information in a competitive and frictionless
labor market is rejected. Symmetric learning as discussed by Gibbons and
Waldman (1999) and Chiappori et al. (1999) also cannot explain our empirical
results. In particular, the serial correlation in wage increases predicted by these
models in absent in our data. However, this prediction depends on assuming
a competitive and frictionless labor market. The substantial returns to job-to-
job transitions seem to reject this assumption. However, wages do not affect
job-to-job transitions, which is usually predicted by job-search theory. There
may be asymmetric employer learning. Indeed, in the presence of asymmetric
employer learning Waldman (1984) predicts large returns to promotions, and
Pinkston (2009) predicts that job-to-job transitions should be associated to
substantial wage increases. An alternative explanation is that workers might
be searching for a good match with employers (e.g. Jovanovic 1979). Indeed,
there is serial correlation in job-to-tob transitions.
We have performed separate analyses for men and women and for different
educational levels. Although, the sizes of the coefficients differ between
subgroups, the signs and significance are almost always the same as for the full
population. Only we considering different sectors, we find different estimation
results. The results for blue-collar workers are to some extent consistent with
symmetric learning in a competitive market. For white-collar workers the labor
market is less competitive or friction might be more important. Observing the
productivity of a blue-collar worker might be easier than of a white-collar
worker, so there might also be more asymmetric learning about the ability of
white-collar workers.
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Appendix: Description of the data
This appendix contains a more detailed description of Quadros de Pessoal, the
matched employer–employee data used in the empirical analyses. The data
are based on a compulsory survey that all firms with wage earners have to
complete. For each year, the data contain information on about two million
workers in the private sector. Both firms and workers have identification codes
that permit to track them over time. For employers, it is mandatory to post the
firm’s response to survey questions concerning information on employees in a
public place inside the firm.
We use data from 1991 to 2000. The data are collected once per year. Until
1993 data were collected in March, and after 1993 in October. Firstly, from
each of the annual surveys we only kept full-time workers between 16 and
65 years old. This restriction excludes about 7.2% of the observations. We also
drop about 14.7% of the observations, because they are employers, members
of cooperations, and employers’ relatives who do not receive any financial
compensation. Since our model describes wage earners, the behavior of these
individuals does not fit in our model.
Next, we performed a series of consistency checks. Firstly, we considered the
identification code, which is a transformation of the social security number.
We dropped obvious invalid codes (less than six digits or more than ten
digits). Furthermore, since the data should describe only full-time workers,
we dropped individuals with two observations in one year (unless the records
were exactly the same in gender, birthday, wage, employer etc.). The excluded
about 6.5% of the observations.
After also dropping observations in which the hierarchical level is missing,
we are left with 16,245,140 yearly observations describing 4,202,736 individu-
als. This is about 70% of the original yearly observations. From this data, we
randomly select 10% of the workers, so 420,274 workers with 1,626,415 yearly
observations.
We checked for inconsistencies in gender, birthday, educational level and
job tenure at the current employer. If we found an inconsistency in the
variables gender, birth date, tenure in the firm or school level, this was repaired
if possible or otherwise the worker was dropped from the data. In total, we
excluded 40,668 workers (and 183,932 worker-year observations) for which we
were not able to recover the correct values of variables.
Finally, we considered wages. Descriptive statistics on wages give some
extreme variations. In particular, some individuals experienced strong wage
changes with opposite signs in consecutive years. Such observation of the data
often suggests that by accident additional digits were added to wages when
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recording the data. This implies that the wage change between year t − 1 and t
and between t and t − 1 are almost similar but with opposite signs. To reduce
measurement errors in wages we have excluded workers who experienced
a wage increase in the top ten percentile in one year and in the lower ten
percentile in the next year (or vice versa). This implies a loss of 16,223 workers,
which is about 4.3% of the workers. The remaining data set contains 363,383
individuals and 1,323,298 worker-year observations.
This final reduction of the sample caused that average wages decreased
about 6.2%. The standard deviation in wages decreased from 112,391 to 98,207
PTE. The wage at the 5th percentile slightly reduced from 60,239 to 59,703
PTE, and at the 95th percentile from 311,155 to 281,899 PTE. Furthermore,
wage increases reduced from 7.2% to 5.5%. It should be stressed that the
sharp wage changes could not be the result from changes in non-regular wage
payments, as these are ignored when constructing wages. The non-regular
wage payments consist of non-systematic payments and extra-time payments,
which equal, on average, 9,427 and 2,510 PTE. This is thus 7.5% and 2% of the
average (regular) wage, respectively.
Structure of the skill levels—Decreto-lei n. 121/78, 2nd June
Level Tasks Skills
1 - Apprentices, Training for a specific task. Identical, but without practice,
interns, trainees to the professional of the
qualification level
they will be assigned.
2 - Non-skilled Simple tasks, diverse and usually Practical knowledge and easily
professionals not specified, totally determined. acquired in a short time.
3 - Semi-skilled Well defined tasks, mainly manual or Professional qualification in a
professionals mechanical (no intellectual work) limited field or practical and
with low complexity, usually routine elementary professional
and sometimes repetitive. knowledge.
4 - Skilled Complex or delicate tasks and usually Complete professional qualification
professionals not repetitive and defined by implying theoretical and applied
the superiors. knowledge.
5 - Higher-skilled Tasks requiring a high technical value Complete professional qualification
professionals and defined in general terms with a specialization adding to
by the superiors. theoretical and applied knowledge.
6 - Supervisors, Orientation of teams, as directed by Complete professional qualification
team leaders, the superiors, but requiring the with a specialization.
foremen knowledge of action process.
7 - Intermediate Organization and adaptation of the Technical and professional
executives guidelines established by the qualifications directed
superiors and directly linked with to executive, research,
the executive work. and management work.
8 - Top executives Definition of the firm general policy Knowledge of management
or consulting on the organization and coordination of firm’s
of the firm. Strategic planning. fundamental activities. Knowledge
Creation or adaptation of technical, of management and coordination
scientific and administrative of the fundamental activities in
methods or processes. the field to which the individual
is assigned and that requires the
study and research of high
responsibility and technical
level problems.
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